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CONSTITUTIONAL (IR)RESPONSIBILITY
Abner S. Greene*
How should we locate the higher law principles of our
Constitution?
Both Jed Rubenfeld and Chris Eisgruber have
produced recent books on constitutional self-government, and both
books address this central issue of constitutional theory.' For both
scholars, although the Supreme Court serves as the principal
interpreter of constitutional principle,2 the Court must locate such
principles in what is sometimes called an "interpretivist" fashion. In
other words, although applied moral and political theory plays a role
in constitutional interpretation, it is a decidedly subordinate role.
Such theorizing is constrained, for Rubenfeld and Eisgruber and all
interpretivists, by materials internal to the American constitutional
order, such as text, precedent, history, or tradition. Rubenfeld's
claims are quite demanding in this regard. His is a theory that I will
call "diachronic commitmentarianism," i.e., his theory explains that
the American people develop constitutional principles over time, that
we become committed to such principles, and that it is the Court's
duty to locate and follow them. Eisgruber is more solicitous of
noninterpretivism, that is, of moral and political theory detached from
these internal sources of constitutional meaning. And Eisgruber takes
to task methods of interpretation that are irresponsible, i.e., that
unjustifiably displace interpretive authority from the Court to other
sources. (For example, Eisgruber offers lovely critiques of the worst
forms of textualism and originalism, precisely on the ground that these
interpretive methods do nothing but obscure the judge's responsibility
for decision.) But Eisgruber, too, ultimately demands that the Court
locate the people's principles in an interpretive fashion, and history
and tradition play an important role in this quest.

* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Jed Rubenfeld and Chris
Eisgruber for writing such terrific books, to Jim Fleming for organizing the day at
Fordham to discuss the books, and to John Nagle for his usual hard-to-answer
comments on my essay.
1. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (2001); Jed
Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government (2001).
2. Neither book is primarily about allocation of interpretive authority. Both
books discuss the United States Supreme Court as the principal interpreter of
constitutional principle. Although I have a few words to say about this below, this
essay takes the books as they are on this point, and also discusses the Court as
principal interpreter.
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In this essay, I challenge these interpretivist claims on strictly
normative grounds. That is, I do not claim that the Court does not
write in interpretivist terms; it most often does. Rather, I argue that
although reference to materials internal to our constitutional order
should play an important role in judicial thinking about concepts such
as "equal protection of the laws" or "freedom of speech," such
materials should play a background rather than foreground role in a
court's ultimate decisionmaking. Such decisionmaking should rest
instead on moral and political reasoning for which the judge can hold
herself fully responsible. First, I lay out Rubenfeld's theory of
diachronic commitmentarianism and Eisgruber's theory of the Court
as locater of the people's principles. Next, I address a key ground of
Rubenfeld's argument, namely, that constitutionalism is the antithesis
of presentism, or modernism, or an allegiance to what currently seems
right. I contend that Rubenfeld's theory of the person, which
undergirds his theory of the nation (our nation, the constitutional
People of the United States), improperly privileges what I call the
"classical" part of what it means to be a human being over what I call
the "modern" aspect. When we return the understanding of what it
means to be a human being to its proper balance, we see that the
ground for a diachronic commitmentarian theory of constitutional
interpretation cannot stand, or at least must take its place as merely
one source of constitutional meaning.
Next, I argue that Rubenfeld improperly equates constitutionalism
with diachronic commitmentarianism. Constitutionalism is indeed
about commitment, but its commitment is to principle over whim, and
this can come in synchronic as well as diachronic form. (That is, the
principle can be stated in the here and now rather than over time.) In
this section, I sketch a theory I call "the currentness of normativity,"
which is the strong version of the claim that to avoid irresponsibility,
decisionmakers must always acknowledge in the foreground their own
moral and political reasoning. I also offer a critique of diachronic
constitutionalism as grounded in a false conception of democratic
legitimacy.
We the People may be legitimately bound only by constitutional
principle that we have had a role in creating. I do not mean to suggest
that judges should defer to the people to determine constitutional
principle. I do mean that the bindingness of judicial orders and
precedent is legitimate only if those affected by such rulings have
reason to believe that they have participated in the process leading up
to the rulings, or have had the opportunity to do so. Thus, in
contradiction to Rubenfeld, I offer praise for Jefferson's support for
generational re-creation of the Constitution. This is not meant to
exclude such important second-order values as stability and
predictability; it does insist, though, that such values be considered by
decisionmakers, but not be given pride of place in the decisionmaking.
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Both Rubenfeld (strongly, it is the main theme of his book) and
Eisgruber (clearly, but less insistently) demand stronger interpretive
continuity than my theory of legitimacy based in generational
participation, and of interpretation foregrounding the currentness of
normativity, will bear. Both books track a more familiar interpretivist
line, in which our constitutional history is a through-line, a narrative
of continuity, of commitment, of constructing a People. In my view, it
is time to see such interpretivist theories as relying heavily on
(unconscious) misreadings, misreadings that render the discontinuous
continuous. Where Harold Bloom's theory of "misprision" explains
how poets misread to break from the past,3 my theory of
constitutional misreading explains how constitutional interpreters
misread to create a continuity with the past that otherwise would not
exist.
I. RUBENFELD'S AND EISGRUBER'S INTERPRETIVIST THEORIES
Rubenfeld's book is about both the self and the nation. The self
and the nation are both free only as they live up to self-chosen
commitments over time. "[T]ime is necessary," proclaims Rubenfeld,
"in a special way to the being of things human: of human being and
hence of human freedom. Every page. of this book is an elaboration
of this proposition."4 Rubenfeld offers a critique of presentism-what
I will call (and Rubenfeld sometimes calls) "modernism." He follows
that critique with an affirmative case for freedom through
commitment-what I will call "classicism."
.Modernism claims that our freedom consists in escaping form,
escaping given methods; rather we must recognize our contingency
and the possibility of radical current choice at any moment.
Rubenfeld analogizes this conception of freedom to the freedom to
speak (rather than to write). And he devotes many pages to railing
against it.
He critiques law and economics, modern art and
architecture, existentialism, Zen Buddhism, and especially dialogic
theories of democracy. For Rubenfeld, speech is the enemy because it
revels in the present, in living human beings' desire and capacity to
govern themselves through current workings-out, rather than through
apprehension of prior writing, that is, through living up to
commitment. "Every self that seeks its freedom-individually or
politically," Rubenfeld writes, "by living in the present fools itself,
either denying or flying from its real, inevitable engagements with past
and future." 5

3. See generally Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence (1973).
4. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 7.
5. Id. at 38.
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In place of presentism, Rubenfeld offers a theory of commitment
over time. "[P]ersonhood," he writes, "just is being-over-time." 6
"[H]ow long does it take to be a person? ... a lifetime. ' 7 For
Rubenfeld, human identity and human freedom are diachronic: "If I
am I only over time, then there is never a present moment at which I
can say, I am. I do not now exist. At any given moment, there will
have been an I only by virtue of my having led a human life."' The
individual person
tries to understand what he ought to do given certain important
lines-relations, attachments, purposes, and so on-with which he
has already inscribed his life. He does not in his deliberation try to
bracket or to step outside his ongoing attachments, either in the
name of present desire or in the name of a present demand to
consider all the reasons that apply to him. He is, rather, entrained in
the task of working out the implications and possibilities of certain
engagements he already has with the world.9
Just as it is wrong to think of the self as free at the current moment,
and just as a proper theory of the self entails diachronic commitments,
so for Rubenfeld is it wrong to think of democracy as the will of the
current people, and so for Rubenfeld is it proper to think of
constitutional self-government as a nation's living up to commitments
over time. A nation is not a person, of course, so there is a problem at
the outset of who the subject of constitutional self-government is.
(That is, "self" here is a metaphor.) Rubenfeld deals with this
problem with a kind of definition:
[1]f a sufficient number of individuals in a given people share the
same general principles over a sufficient period of time, and if they
are prepared to create and live under institutions that preserve these
principles, then it becomes possible ... to speak of popular, national
commitments to these principles."'
Rubenfeld offers a critique of political self-government on the
model of speech, and then advances his affirmative theory of
diachronic commitmentarianism. His critique flows from his critique
of modernism, and of a presentist view of the self. Each of four
versions of "constitutional self-government on the model of speech""
fails to capture the fact that freedom comes only through diachronic
commitment. Thus, he critiques judicial review that would be merely
responsive to current popular will, or that would be merely
proceduralist, interested only in clearing a path for current popular
will. He critiques a form of narrow originalism, which would simply
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 137.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 45.
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channel the will of a past people. He critiques judicial review that
would hypothesize a possible will of the people. Finally, he critiques
judicial review based in a liberal conception of rights, based in liberal
political theory. All of these speech-modeled theories of selfgovernment miss this:
Constitutional law is a set of substantive, foundational commitments-commitments to principles of justice and liberty and
power-laid down by the nation to govern itself. These temporally
extended commitments cannot be captured in proceduralist terms,
nor indeed in any speech-modeled logic."
And this:
Government by present voice is incompatible with law, because law
can never be merely spoken. It requires a writing; it requires
language preserved over time. Law is always written. (Even in a
society whose law is preserved solely by oral tradition.) And
government requires law. Which is to say: a people can govern 3itself
only by both being governed by its past and governing its future.'

Rubenfeld then translates these insights into a theory of
constitutional
self-government.
Constitutionalism
requires
interpretation, and the "cardinal rule of this interpretive task is that
interpretation of commitments cannot be permitted to collapse into
governance by the self's present will."' 4 Instead, "[c]onstitutional
interpretation in written self-government must itself be a written
project, an enterprise in which one text is intermeshed with another
and another over a long period of time."' 5 In sum:
A written constitution's normative force depends ultimately on
whether it works to recall a people to itself over time: a means b
which a people re-collects itself and its fundamental commitments.
Rubenfeld also offers a more specific method for cashing out his
theory of diachronic commitmentarianism.
He calls his method
"paradigm case interpretation."' 7 This method requires the Court to
look to the foundational paradigm case of a constitutional prohibition,
and to reason from that foundational case to the case at bar. Or it
requires the Court to look to the foundational paradigm case of a
constitutional permission, or a constitutional requirement, and reason
similarly from paradigm case to the case at bar. But a constitutional
prohibition tells us only about what the framers of that text meant to
prohibit, not about what they meant to permit. This is true also for
permissions and requirements. For example, the framers of the Equal
12. Id. at 73.
13. Id. at 86.
14. Id. at 172.

15. Id. at 173.
16. Id. at 177.
17. Id. at ch. 10.
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Protection Clause meant to wipe out the Reconstruction black codes,
which singled out blacks for various legal disabilities. Those same
framers, it seems, were entirely unconcerned about governmental
segregation of public schools.
That permission-allowing
governmentally segregated public schools-is not what matters for
constitutional interpretation, says Rubenfeld. Rather, we must reason
from the core prohibition-which he reads as an anti-caste principleto the case at bar, and conclude that governmentally segregated public
schools in 1954 violate such a principle."
In sum, for Rubenfeld, individual self-government and national
constitutional self-government make no sense through a prism of the
here and now. A person only becomes a person and a nation only
becomes a nation over time, by making commitments and then by
living up to them. Although the commitments may change, they are
the foundational pieces of freedom, both for the self and for the
nation.
In this way, Rubenfeld's theory of constitutional
interpretation is deeply interpretivist, that is, it is deeply committed to
knitting together materials from our constitutional text and history, to
recapturing the principles to which the framers of constitutional text
were committed, and then to analyzing how those principles must be
understood over time.
Eisgruber's book nods far more in the direction of
noninterpretivism, but at the crucial point adopts a backward-looking
interpretivism not wholly unlike Rubenfeld's.
At the core of
Eisgruber's book is a concern with ensuring impartiality in
governance, and with judicial responsibility in so doing. Eisgruber
advances this theory of democracy:
To qualify as democratic, a government must respond to the
interests and opinions of all the people, rather than merely serving
the majority, or some other fraction of the people. I will refer to this
goal as impartiality.'9
Eisgruber elaborates the theme of impartiality. Even though we
may disagree about important matters, often of moral controversy, for
democracy to work we must see morality as distinct from mere
preference, that moral positions must be backed by moral reasons,
and that such positions benefit from discussion and argument.2"
Moreover, when a debate is finished and a vote is taken, the losers
must be able to see their loss as temporary.2' "In sum, if people have
faith that institutionally structured political discussion is likely (over
the long term) to produce moral progress, then their faith can enable

18. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. Eisgruber, supra note 1, at 19.

20. See id. at 55.
21. Id. at 56.
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them to regard choices
among contested values as impartial, and
22
democratic.
hence
Federal judges are ideally situated to ensure such impartiality.
They are life-tenured, and thus relatively insulated from political
pressure 2 3 they must take moral responsibility for their decisions,
both because they act in small groups and because they must give a
public account of their decisionmaking (through judicial opinions).2 4
Eisgruber frequently adverts to the importance of judicial
responsibility. He criticizes judges who: "invoke history in order to
deflect attention from justice" for "shirking the responsibility the
Constitution assigns to them"; 25 "attempt to justify controversial
rulings by citing ambiguous precedents";2 6 "veil their true reasons
behind unilluminating formulae and quotations borrowed from
previous cases"; 27 are obsessed "with textual specificity," thus
"obscuring the judgments [the Court] makes and so insulating them
from effective public criticism";21 "pretend they are not making
political judgments themselves, and that their decisions were forced
upon them by textual details or historical facts. '29 Again and again,
Eisgruber accuses courts of obscuring questions of principle, of hiding
behind, for example, invocations of tradition.30
But how should the Court reason about questions of principle?
How should the Court interpret the "ambiguous moral and political
language"' that Eisgruber correctly notes is at the heart of many hard
constitutional cases?
Here Eisgruber turns away from a
noninterpretivist idea of the Court as disinterested forum for the
development of constitutional principle, and toward the interpretivist
idea of the Court as conduit of the people's principles. Here is what
he writes:
The job of judges is to speak on behalf of the American people on
(certain) matters of justice ....
Constructing the American people's conception of justice is not the
same thing as expressing one's own conception of justice or as
expressing the best conception of justice, whatever that may mean.
In a democratic political system, judges engaged in judicial review
cannot simply act on the basis of their own best judgments about
justice; they must instead act on the basis of a conception of justice

22. Id.

23. Id. at 57-59.
24. Id. at 59-62.
25. Id. at 8.

26. Id. at 70.
27. Id.

28. Id. at 119.
29. Id. at 135.
30. See id. at 149, 153,161.
31. Id. at 34; see also id. at 35, 39, 205, 207.
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with which32 Americans
themselves.

in

general

could

plausibly

identify

sometimes invokes this hypothetical
Although Eisgruber
conception of the principles of the people ("plausibly" identify
themselves rather than "actually" identify themselves),3 3 he does not
mean the judicial task to be a kind of Rawlsian hypotheticalism.
Rather, by "plausibly," Eisgruber means that the interpretation in any
particular case must plausibly replicate the people's own judgments of
principle. Indeed, if a judge feels her sense of justice out of synch with
that of the people, "democratic principles require that she act on the
basis of what she considers to be the people's best judgment about
justice, rather than her own. ' 34 Eisgruber occasionally uses language
that suggests a less deferential and more judicially unconstrained
posture when he writes of the Court's "constructing" the people's
sense of justice. But more often, and more centrally, his formulation
is of the Court seeking to ascertain, rather than to construct, "the
American people's view of justice."36
Although Eisgruber critiques judicial reference to history and
tradition when such reference does nothing but obscure the difficult
arguments of principle with which the Court must grapple, he has
much kinder words for judicial use of history and tradition as evidence
of the people's principles:
[H]istory matters specially to constitutional adjudication not
because.., judges have an obligation to preserve the past, but
because historical argument can sometimes help them to represent
the people's convictions about justice. More specifically, a sensitive
examination of the historical record may help judges to test the
justice and those
connection between their own intuitions about
37
held by the American people more generally.
He adds that when law departs from tradition in ways that plausibly
raise liberty concerns, such departure should receive special judicial
scrutiny. 5

32. Id. at 126.
33. See id. at 129.
34. Id. at 130.
35. See id. at 8, 121, 123.
36. Id. at 120. Sometimes Eisgruber's formulation is that the Court must speak
about justice "on behalf of" the American people. See id. at 7, 57, 126. This
formulation is ambiguous as to whether the Court must look to the people for an
elaboration of principle or whether the Court constructs principle with which it
believes the people would concur. The bulk of the book, though, especially in the
discussion of history and tradition, is about capturing the people's principles rather
than developing them for the people.
37. Id. at 110-11.
38. See id. at 147, 163. For a more instrumental use of tradition, see id. at 143
("[T]radition may in some cases be a useful guide to the best means by which the
judiciary can pursue constitutionally desirable ends.").
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II. RUBENFELD'S IMPROPER PRIVILEGING OF THE CLASSICAL OVER
THE MODERN

Throughout his book, Rubenfeld critiques conceptions of the
human self that foreground present desire and awareness. He
privileges conceptions that foreground how we come to know
ourselves over time. The former, he says, make us unfree. The latter
make us free. For example:
In personal life, [the conjunction of liberty with present will] puts
freedom at war with character and with all the commitments,
professional or intimate, in which we find ourselves engaged. It
leaves us mystified, in other words, by the people we
39 are, the
monuments we have built, and the aspirations we pursue.
Quite to the contrary, I want to suggest, a conception of the human
self rooted in diachronic commitments entails its own brand of
mystification. The proper conception of what it means to be a human
being involves a delicate balance between commitments and present
desire. As T.S. Eliot wrote in "Ash Wednesday": "Teach us to care
and not to care/ Teach us to sit still."4"' Using "caring" as a placeholder for commitment, and using "not caring" as a place-holder for
action free from commitment, I want to suggest that "sitting still" is an
apt metaphor for the balance that properly describes the human
condition. Rubenfeld's book is all about one side of this balance, and
as this conception of the human self undergirds Rubenfeld's argument
for diachronic commitmentarianism in constitutional theory, it is
worth spending some time to expose the conception as false.
We are both human and being. As human, our minds expose us to
the pleasures and pains of history, of time. We anticipate with glee,
we look back on fondly, we plan with enormous expectation. But we
also regret, we mourn, we desire with unmet voraciousness. This
being-for-itself allows us, perhaps paradoxically, to imagine what it
would be like to escape time, to be the divine. Language is a good
example of how this paradox works. Language allows us to name, to
point toward, to overcome gaps between our situatedness and the
world. It allows us, in other words, to point toward a condition in
which we would not need language, in which all would be immediately
known and apprehended. It allows us to represent the condition of
the divine. But at the same time, language reminds us of our
humanness, of the fact that we are not divine, of the fact that we need
language to overcome, to mediate, to represent. Being-for-itself is
teleological: it points toward (backwards or forwards). It is, in this
way, "classical."
By which I mean: Think about Platonism, or
Christianity, or Hegel. All involve conceptions that point human
39. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 4.
40. T.S. Eliot, The Complete Poems and Plays 1909-1950, at 60 (Harcourt, Brace
& World, Inc. 1971).
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beings toward a nonhuman end-Platonic forms; Christian salvation;
Hegelian pure Spirit. These conceptions, and many others, are ways
for we human corporeal beings to imagine ways out of our condition,
to yearn toward the infinite.
We are also beings. As beings we are mortal, we are animals, we
are born and die, our existence is contingent, it is being-in-itself. The
modernists grasped this, and in various ways tried to explain how our
classical self-consciousness grapples with the brute fact of our
animalness.
(Interestingly, some of these so-called modernists
themselves have foundational conceptions of the human condition.
Witness Marx's theory of the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism
and the ascension of the proletariat; witness Freud's theory of the
dominant force of the unconscious and of primary psychosexual
positioning.)
Both classicism and modernism have fetishistic, mystifying
extensions. For classicism, it is taking our humanness out of time. For
modernism, it is reducing our humanness to our material existence.
We are both material (and thus in time) and human (and thus,
through our mind's ability to imagine the divine, out-of-time).
Reducing us to one or the other is a mistake, and it is a mistake I fear
Rubenfeld makes in his book. As the various quotations above make
clear, Rubenfeld privileges diachronic commitment over present
desire. In the next section I critique Rubenfeld's conception of
freedom, which tracks this privileging. Here it is sufficient for me to
have made a case for humans as both human and being. Neither can
be given privilege of place. Such privileging constitutes mystification,
or bad faith. Sartre refers to "the double property of the human
being, which is at once a facticity [being in-itself, our corporeal being]
and a transcendence [being for-itself, our human self-consciousness]."
He adds, "These two aspects of human reality are and ought to be
capable of a valid coordination. But bad faith does not wish either to
coordinate them or to surmount them in a synthesis."4 1
The
mystification of being-for-itself, to use Sartre's terminology, is the
extension of our human-ness (as opposed to our being-ness) over
time, at the expense of our being in time-say, at the moment one is
reading this sentence, or writing it.42 Marx writes of the mystification
that ensues when human beings forget that they are the origin of the
value of commodities, and instead posit a "value" of the commodity
coming from the commodity itself.43 Does not Rubenfeld engage in
41. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness 98 (Hazel E. Barnes trans.,
Gramercy Books 1994) (1956).
42. See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 95 ("Is there really nothing else that you, the
reader, at this moment, the moment you are reading this sentence, would prefer to be
doing'?").
43. Karl Marx, Capital, in The Marx-Engels Reader 319-29 (Robert C. Tucker ed.,
2d ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1978).
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just such mystification when he writes-"Many animals speak; man
alone writes"?44 Does this not neglect the other half of the equationthat man is also an animal? Similarly, Rubenfeld writes,
There is no such thing as a "present person." In this sense, we can
never properly say of ourselves, "I am." ... A person is, but always
and only in the sense of being in being: in progress ....
Some things, like a circle or a rock or a stereo, ma be what they are
all at once, in the present.... But not so persons.4
But a person exists, not "always and only" as a being "in progress,"
but also as an animal being, as extant in the moment, as not selfconscious, as subject to forces both external (the elements) and
internal (autonomic systems). We are both human and being, and it is
a dangerous mystification to privilege either the classical yearning for
the infinite or the modern apprehension of contingency.
I[I. CONSTITUTIONALISM AS COMMITMENT, BUT NOT NECESSARILY
DIACHRONIC

Even if one agrees with my ontological claims in the prior section,
critiquing Rubenfeld for privileging the classical over the modern in
describing what it means to be a human being, one might still argue
that
constitutionalism
requires
commitment-over-time.
Constitutionalism is about constraining the will of current majorities,
one might argue, and these constraints are located diachronically, in
commitments the American people make and hold themselves to over
time. This is the view of many constitutional scholars,4 6 and it is
Rubenfeld's and Eisgruber's view as well. As I set forth above, both
authors make history and tradition a central reference point for
constitutional interpretation.
I believe this notion-that
constitutionalism requires fidelity to prior law-is incorrect; rather,
constitutionalism requires fidelity to higher law. To get to this
conclusion, first let me say a word about freedom.
I have not said much about the title of Rubenfeld's book-Freedom
and Time. Rubenfeld consistently advances the idea that human
freedom is found only over time, through developing a self based in
diachronic commitments. (He then extends this conception to the
nation.) For example: "[F]reedom is always a struggle over the
authorship of our commitments. Man must commit himself to be
free."47 We can walk away from commitments, he says, but "we do
44. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 141.
45. Id. at 140.
46. And they vary in political disposition. See, e.g., 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the
People: Foundations (1991); 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations
(1998); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law (1990).
47. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 97.
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not attain a true or pure freedom at such moments of rupture. On the
contrary, we will be obliged to start again, to find other temporally
extended engagements within which to live."4 Rubenfeld does not
clearly work out this theory of freedom. He works out why he
believes diachronic commitments are necessary for becoming a
person, and necessary to constitutional self-government. But his
additional claim that freedom is found only through diachronic
commitments is less well-supported in the book. Perhaps Rubenfeld's
is the Kantian notion that freedom is meaningless in the abstract, that
freedom makes sense, conceptually, only when we speak of becoming
free from something, from some constraints. And one is not free if the

constraints are imposed from without. So by giving ourselves
constraints (sometimes referred to as "law") we become free. But just
as we cannot be truly free under another's boot, neither can we be
free in an anarchic condition, because the oppression of disorder
would take over. My objection is not to this well-accepted and
defensible conception of freedom. It is to the privileging of diachronic
commitments in locating freedom. Even if we accept the Kantian idea
of autonomy (living under law one gives to oneself, either as an
individual or as a nation), it still could be synchronic rather than
diachronic.
The problem with diachronic theories of freedom, and with
diachronic theories of constitutionalism, is that they obscure the
responsibility of the interpreter, who is living and breathing and
reading and writing and interpreting now, not in the past.
Interpretation is necessarily a normative task, and it involves the
acquisition of knowledge. There is no mechanical interpretation,
because texts are codes of meaning and because human beings are not
gods. Even the apparently simplest interpretation -a so-called "easy
case"-relies on prior knowledge held by the interpreter that
submerges the contested beneath the uncontested, that foregrounds
the known and backgrounds the unknown. But the failure to
foreground at all times the work we have done to acquire
understandings of texts to make those texts appear easy is a failure
worthy of the appellation "mystification" or "fetishism" or "bad
faith." This is not to say that interpreters must reinvent the wheel.
There are many reasons to establish rules of interpretation; like rules
of the road, they coordinate behavior and save time in
decisionmaking. But unlike rules of the road, rules of interpretation
Interpretersshould always be transparent in their purpose.
especially interpreters of legal texts that govern the real lives of real
people-should take second-order values such as stability,
predictability, and the like into account when interpreting, and thus
should use rules of the interpretive road. But these rules should
48. Id. at 128.
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always remain unmasked as rules, always open to revision and
overriding at any moment, always transparent in the substantive good
they serve so they can be exposed as disserving those or other values
as the case may be.4 9
In this way, any decision made today by a Supreme Court Justice to
"defer" to a decision made in a prior day must itself be normatively
justified now. I want to make two claims about why deference to
framers' understanding, or history, or tradition, while helpful in
interpreting vague texts such as "equal protection of the laws" or
"freedom of speech," can never be the appropriate touchstone of
constitutional interpretation. First: Why is reference to the past so
appealing in constitutional interpretation? Why do so many judges
and scholars see it not just as helpful, but as necessary? I believe
these arguments are based in a false theory of democratic legitimacy.
The argument begins (in liberal democracies, with elected, limited
government, rights, judicial review, etc.) from a premise of individual
self-government, a version of autonomy. But that more literal form of
self-government yields to "self-government" as metaphor: We elect
representatives to govern; they are our delegates; this is a republican
form of government; we must always remember that we are the
principals, they the agents. Our charters of government-be they the
higher law charter of the Constitution or the lower law charters of
laws, regulations, etc.-are reflections of our will as filtered through
our representatives. Text is not self-standing; plain meaning is in many
49. To some extent, my disagreement with Rubenfeld is about foreground and
background.
I agree with Rubenfeld that history matters in constitutional
interpretation. See Jed Rubenfeld, Of ConstitutionalSelf-Government, 71 Fordham L.
Rev. 1749, 1763-64 (2003).
Rubenfeld agrees with me that current judicial
interpreters of the Constitution must exercise current normative judgment. Here is
his clearest statement on this:
Constitutional interpretation is irreducibly normative. The foundational
paradigm cases give a decisive structure to constitutional law, but this
structure must still be elaborated, and in this elaboration there is no escaping
the exercise of normative judgment. Nor is there a reason to want to escape
from such judgment, which is a necessary part of giving any commitment
meaning.
Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 200. The difference between Rubenfeld's theory and
mine is that Rubenfeld insists on history giving a "decisive structure" to constitutional
law, and he insists on this based on the principal argument he makes throughout the
book, that constitutionalism is about a nation's developing and living up to its
commitments-over-time. Rubenfeld foregrounds the ways in which constitutional
interpreters are bound, and backgrounds the current normative judgments. He says
that a commitment provides "a reason to act," id. at 117, that such a reason is
"weighty," id. at 102, that commitments indeed exert "strong normative force ... over
time." Id. at 125. In so arguing, Rubenfeld aligns himself with legal theorists such as
Fred Schauer, who has written elegantly on the rule-ness of law, on how a rule (and
law) displaces current all-things-considered normative judgment by providing socalled content-independent reasons to act. See Frederick Schauer, Playing by the
Rules (1991). My argument that Rubenfeld improperly foregrounds the diachronic is
directly parallel to my critique of Schauer's work in Abner S. Greene, The Work of
Knowledge, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1479 (1997).
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interesting ways the true opposite of originalism; rather, text is a
window into what our representatives did, what policies/principles
they wished to advance; and what they did is what we did, we the
principals/authors, we the legitimate source of power, we the
sovereign people. Thus, originalism (as thought of intelligently) is a
legitimating device: It acknowledges that texts must be interpreted
(i.e., there is no "plain meaning"), but that the authorized interpreters
should view their role as recapturing what the principals (us via our
representatives) wanted. That makes sense for wills, for contracts,
and many times for statutes. So why not for constitutions? Or for our
Constitution?
One response is that even on originalist terms, the framers didn't
want future interpreters to be originalists, and that is why they wrote
so many abstract moral rights at various times into the Constitution's
text.i' But the response on which I want to focus is different.
Originalism, I believe, is based on a false view of democratic
legitimacy. For a current generation of Americans to defer to a prior
one is to assume that we are bound to obey their understandings. But
we never consented to such obedience. To alienate my sovereignty to
a prior generation assumes a strong version of duty to obey based in
the "born here, reside here, accept benefits, therefore are bound"
argument of political obligation. That argument is not quite as
slippery as the "consent" argument (which is notoriously impossible to
prove), 51 but it is close to being as bad. 52 As I show in the next section,
there is a different view of constitutional interpretation that better
legitimates our duty as citizens to obey the law, and it is based in a
generational-participation model of citizenship.
Second: A somewhat different take on the democratic legitimacy
argument might accept what I have just written, but nonetheless argue
that for unelected life-tenured federal judges legitimately to assert
50. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985).
51. See Nancy J. Hirschmann, Freedom, Recognition, and Obligation: A Feminist
Approach to Political Theory, in The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected Philosophical
Readings 243, 246 (William A. Edmundson ed., 1999); David A.J. Richards,
Conscience, Human Rights, and the Anarchist Challenge to the Obligation to Obey the
Law, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 771, 782-83 (1984); Rolf Sartorius, Political Authority and
Political Obligation, in The Duty to Obey the Law, supra, at 143, 144, 150-51; Philip
Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation to Obey, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 891, 900-02 (1984);
Jeremy Waldron, Special Ties and Natural Duties, in The Duty to Obey the Law,
supra, at 271, 292.
52. See Kent Greenawalt, Promise, Benefit, and Need: Ties That Bind Us to the
Law, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 727, 754-64 (1984); Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey: Revision
and Tradition, in The Duty to Obey the Law, supra note 51, at 159, 172; Sartorius,
supra note 51, at 144, 155; A. John Simmons, The Principle of FairPlay, in The Duty
to Obey the Law, supra note 51, at 107; M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie
Obligation to Obey the Law?, in The Duty to Obey the Law, supra note 51, at 75, 8183, 85; Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Obligation to Obey the Law, in The Duty to
Obey the Law, supra note 51, at 17, 37.
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interpretive authority, they must view themselves as bound by
constraints outside their own moral or political reasoning, and what
better place to locate such constraints than in the understandings of
those who drafted (or ratified) the constitutional text. This argument
is wrong for two separate reasons.
First, federal judges are not philosophers who alighted on our
nation's soil and assumed interpretive authority. They are placed on
the bench via a transparently political process involving the President
and the Senate. Their jurisdiction is controlled by federal law. And
Congress has the power to impeach them. So although they are not
subject to case-by-case check (at least the Supreme Court is not) and
although they do not have to stand for election or reelection, federal
judges are still politically checked in three important ways, which
should be sufficient to buttress their democratic legitimacy.
Moreover, as Eisgruber makes clear, the disinterestedness of federal
judges fits well with most understandings (originalist and otherwise)
of our constitutional structure. The checking value of disinterested
federal judges on political institutions is a further argument helping
legitimate the federal courts, wholly apart from whether they look to
history when interpreting constitutional text.
Second, insisting that judges interpreting today defer to
understandings of prior generations on abstract terms such as "equal
protection of the laws" or "freedom of speech" obscures the current
normative assessment that today's judges must necessarily make.
There are no mechanical ways of recapturing framers' intent, or
history, or tradition. Judges may try to make history seem like math,
but it's not, especially in the context of interpreting abstract texts.
Nonetheless, understanding historical sources can be helpful to a
judge's current normative interpretive task, even if it is not required
by democratic legitimacy. There is no such thing as interpretation in a
vacuum. A judge living today cannot decide whether (say) affirmative
action programs in public higher education do or do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause by gazing into the sky or down to the ground.
He or she will have been raised in a certain place, at a certain time,
with certain cultural referents. Reading and understanding how such
cultural referents came into being cannot but help inform the judge's
necessarily normative judgment.5 3
53. Rubenfeld maintains that just as a nation lives according to rules of the road
set down earlier-for example, rules regarding how we select our federal officials,
how they make laws, etc.-so does a nation live according to principles of justice,
instantiated in the Constitution, set down over time. See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at
75-83. To some extent Rubenfeld and I agree: We agree that judges interpreting
today cannot help but understand abstract terms such as "equal protection of the
laws" or "freedom of speech" in the context of their world, which includes their
understanding of the culture in which they live, which includes an understanding of
history.
But Rubenfeld is not simply making this descriptive point about
interpretation. He is making a normative argument about what constitutionalism (at
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Both Rubenfeld and Eisgruber attack originalism. But both ask
federal judges to look to history and tradition in interpreting the
Constitution. As discussed above, for Rubenfeld this is central to his
diachronic commitmentarian theory of the Constitution, and he
applies it via his paradigm-case theory. For Eisgruber, the look to
history and tradition is necessary for judges to speak on behalf of the
people's principles. Thus, although both have no use for the less
intelligent forms of originalism, both are still wed to constitutionalism
as priorlaw rather than constitutionalism as higher law, and that is the
claim I have challenged in this section.
IV. A GENERATIONAL-PARTICIPATION THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL BINDINGNESS

Constitutional theories based in diachronic commitmentarianism
are one example of a kind of rule-based thinking that pervades many
areas of legal scholarship. Law-whether it is the law of a statute, the
framers of a constitutional provision, the historical understanding of
such a provision, or the Court's precedent-commands respect and
obedience because it constrains current behavior in a way that is
legitimate and that advances second-order values such as stability and
predictability. But if one can show that law, in all these forms, lacks a
foundation in democratic legitimacy, then law's claims would have to
be reconsidered.
I believe that such a case against law's prima facie legitimacy can be
made. Here I can only sketch the case. Law claims a fullness, a
bindingness on present actors in the name of external constraints.
Those constraints are of various sorts; all are justified, though,
through related theories of democratic legitimacy: We the people are
sovereign, but we the people have authorized various other personsConstitution-writers and ratifiers, courts, and legislatures-to make
law on our behalf, and such law is presumptively legitimate, it
presumptively binds. But what if this presumption proves false?
What if law's fullness proves to be pock-marked, to be a show of
fullness behind which are tenuous claims of bindingness? What if
throughout our legal system one could show that at virtually every
turn, legitimacy must be found in law's exceptions, in its limitations, in
its leavings-alone? What if in addition to such legitimation through
negation, law were legitimated only through a more hands-on,
presentist notion of consent through participation?
The argument for this can be summarized as follows: Autonomy of
the self is the baseline proposition. One cedes autonomy for various
reasons, but unless one has ceded autonomy knowingly and
least ours) should be, and on that point, I have tried to show throughout this essay
why I believe the claim improperly privileges the classical, the teleological, the
diachronic.
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voluntarily, claims by others over the self are illegitimate. Sometimes
such consent exists-say in a private organization, or maybe a small
town in which the founders are all alive. But most often legitimationthrough-consent is merely fictional, and thus cannot undergird
political obligation.54
The next most-offered theory for such
obligation is based in residence and receipt of benefits. Reciprocity is
the idea: If you live in a place, and remain voluntarily, and receive
benefits, you have tacitly consented to law's authority, or even if tacit
consent is discarded as a useless concept, it is just to bind you to law's
authority under such circumstances. This is a complex issue. The
principal point against reciprocity as sufficient to undergird political
obligation is that whatever claims of consent or justice one can make
from residency and benefits, they are too weak to support law's
plenary claim for obedience." A more promising line of justifying
law's obligation is through second-order claims; namely, without law,
we would lose the stability, order, and predictability that we all desire.
We are no more likely to retain autonomy in a law-less state, for there
we fall subject to the ravages of disorder. Such second-order claims,
however, do not provide a theory of legitimacy; rather they avoid the
question. Moreover, one can account for second-order concerns in an
all-things-considered view of obligation. That is, if one takes the view
that law does not legitimately obligate, one can still argue that it is
most often correct to obey law. Here one would have to consider
many factors, such as the justness of the system, both procedurally and
substantively, the risk of error from disobedience, the likelihood of
others following suit, etc. It is correct to ask whether such all-thingsconsidered judgments are more or less likely to lead to overall societal
well-being than following the presumption that law obligates. I
believe that question can be answered in favor of scrapping a plenary
theory of law's obligation and adopting instead a reticulated view of
case-by-case judgment. But I will say no more about that in this essay.
The case against law's prima facie legitimacy (in all the forms
discussed here, most centrally including the grip of the past) extends
both to citizens' obligation and to interpretive, theory. Just as I am not
morally bound to obey law (not statutes, not the Constitution or its
framers or interpreters), so institutional constitutional interpreters
should view their interpretive role as plastic, plural, and normative.
Plastic: Institutional constitutional interpreters are not bound by any
particular source of constitutional meaning, for no source has the
stamp of legitimacy. Plural: Institutional constitutional interpreters
are many. The Supreme Court is just one among many. For various
second-order reasons, it is often correct for other institutional
constitutional interpreters to follow or "obey" the Court. But it is not
54. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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required by political morality, nor by institutional role. Normative:
As I have argued throughout this essay, interpretation is irreducibly
normative, and normativity is irreducibly current. One must look to
external sources to interpret texts (this is a conceptual point; there is
no such thing as interpretation otherwise), but one is not bound by
any proper theory of democratic legitimacy to do so in any particular
way.
Having said all this, I want to add a few words about a way in which
legitimacy can come to the American constitutional system. Consider
a spectrum with one's own autonomous decisions at one end, and
displacement of authority to long-dead people at the other. A
generational theory of constitutional interpretation can bridge this
gap. I might not myself participate in any court case or any legislative
debate that results in an act of constitutional interpretation. But if I
am alive, and am able to vote, speak, write, and petition for redress of
grievances, I have the capacity to participate, along with others of my
generation, in constitutional creation and interpretation. I cannot
reasonably complain when law is created or interpreted that binds me.
Although this theory of generational participation needs much
working-out, and although it cannot provide the pure legitimacy that
consent demands, I believe it is the strongest available legitimating
tool to undergird political obligation in our system and to provide a
solution to the plurality problem of constitutional interpretation. On
this view, a political actor (say, a Governor) should give far more
weight to a Supreme Court precedent that she had an opportunity to
influence than to a precedent from a prior generation. This means
that constitutional issues will have to be revisited, rethought,
reaffirmed or edited or scrapped. Diachronic commitments may play
a role in such rethinking, but always the voice and authority of those
alive (those under threat of being bound by law) will be in the
foreground."
56. For Rubenfeld's critique of Jefferson's argument for generational
constitutional re-creation, see Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 18-26. To the extent that
Rubenfeld's anti-Jeffersonian argument is based in a critique of presentism in favor of
diachronic commitmentarianism, I have already responded at length in the text.
Rubenfeld also claims that Jefferson's idea has a reductio ad absurdum problem,
namely, that the logic of Jefferson's position dictates that even a generation is too
long, i.e., that only the will of the people at the present moment can legitimately bind.
This critique fails to see generational reinterpretation (or re-creation, I am not bound
to one formulation over the other) as a way of bridging the gap between two
situations, each of which would lead to a loss of autonomy: pure anarchy, in which law
binds only if it is the subject of unanimous ongoing consent, which it never is; and
diachronic commitmentarianism, in which we are constantly ceding our autonomy to
long-dead authorities.
A generational-participation theory of constitutional
interpretation provides a middle ground. If it too does not fully legitimate authority,
(a) it comes closer to legitimating authority while retaining autonomy than does pure
presentism or diachronic commitmentarianism, and (b) it recognizes more openly the
failure of law's claims to fullness and the need to view law as open to exceptions and
change, continuously, for law ever to have a chance legitimately to bind.
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V. THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: MISREADING TO CREATE A
FALSE CONTINUITY

In his seminal work The Anxiety of Influence, Harold Bloom uses
the term "misprision" to refer to a poet's misreadings of influential
texts, misreadings in the service of freeing the poet from the grip of
the past." I believe that much of American constitutional law, as set
down in Supreme Court opinions, as well as American constitutional
theory, such as Rubenfe!d's and Eisgruber's books, engage in a
different sort of misreading. Rather than misreading to break from
the past, American constitutional authors misread to create a false
illusion of continuity, to free themselves from the grip of the present.
It is hard to argue for the constitutionality of (say) racial affirmative
action programs by pointing to justice-based distinctions between
invidious and benign racial classifications. By "hard" I do not mean it
is hard analytically; actually the justice-based case for racial
affirmative action is fairly easy to make. Instead, by "hard" I mean
hard for interpreters of the American Constitution to free themselves
from the grip of the past, from the notion that they are unauthorized
to engage in current normative argumentation, from the (false) idea
that their interpretive acts are legitimate only insofar as they are
bound to prior authors, to framers, to prior Courts, to the people
more generally.
Our constitutional text may be fairly continuous, but our
constitutional law is not. It is marked by dramatic shifts, by (mostly)
real advances in the name of justice. These advances have not been
made by dead people, nor by living people in the name of the dead.
They have been made by each generation, as the people, the political
actors, and the Court have grappled with moral concepts such as
"equal protection of the laws" and "freedom of speech." The
responsibility for interpreting such concepts has rested in each
interpreter, despite the many ways in which interpreters have sought
to deflect responsibility, often in the name of an erroneous conception
of constitutionalism as prior law.

57. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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